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//I abridged your abstract so that it will fit into the layout template. Feel free 
to revise, keeping the abstract under 100 words.// 
Botnets are one of the most powerful cyberthreats affecting continuity and 
delivery of existing network services. Detecting and mitigating attacks 
promoted by botnets become a greater challenge with the advent of 5G 
networks, as the number of connected devices with high mobility 
capabilities, the volume of exchange data, and the transmission rates 
increase significantly. Here, a 5G-oriented solution is proposed for 
proactively detecting and mitigating botnets in a highly dynamic 5G network. 
5G subscribers’ mobility requires dynamic network reconfiguration, which 
is handled by combining software-defined network and network function 
virtualization techniques. 
Internet/Web technologies, botnet, 5G, mobility, SDN, NFV 
The incoming fifth-generation (5G) mobile technology aims to offer huge data bandwidth 
and high networking capabilities to bring superb users’ experiences on mobile 
communications. Meeting the demands of 5G is more than merely increasing the 
computational and bandwidth resources of the infrastructure, although these improvements 
still represent a crucial driver.1 Although not every detail of 5G has been disclosed yet, 
new security challenges will arise (as discussed in other work2). 
The announced number and heterogeneity of 5G devices, with high mobility capabilities, 
entail an ever-evolving threats landscape. One of the most powerful threats in 5G will 
remain the malicious actions led by botnets, as in existing networks. A botnet is a network 
of thousands, millions of compromised devices known as bots, infected by an 
unconsciously installed malware, going on to be controlled by a command and control 
(C&C) server remotely. Typically, recruited bots ask from time to time to the C&C if they 
should trigger actions. How botnets behave, their architecture, and communication patterns 
among bots and C&C servers are widely reviewed elsewhere.3 
Among the potential malicious actions that a botnet owner can request, DDoS attacks 
are often the most commonly used today. Kaspersky Lab reported for the third quarter of 
2016 that the botnet-assisted DDoS attacks comprised //correct?// 78.9 percent of all 
detected attacks, where the largest number was observed on 3 August 2016 with 1,746 
attacks.4 As real examples, the Mirai and Leet botnets launched crippling DDoS attacks in 
2016, reaching up to 650 gigabits per second (Gbps) of network traffic to disrupt services 
of Amazon and Netflix, among others. 
Detecting and mitigating botnets have been addressed by many works,5 among which 
we can highlight BotHunter6,7 as a popular detector. BotHunter focuses on detecting 
specific stages of the malware infection process, conducted during the first recruitment 
phase, while BotMiner consists of a network anomaly-based botnet detection system that 
clusters similar traffic to identify C&C communication patterns. Yet, they focus on 
inspecting network packet payloads, which isn’t a feasible choice in 5G because of the 
large volumes of data generated from 5G subscribers’ User Equipment (UE), causing Deep 
Packet Inspection (DPI) tools to be overloaded. To address this drawback, many works 
move toward higher levels of detection to analyze swiftly the basic information of network 
flows. Rodrigo Braga and colleagues,8 for example, proposed an unsupervised artificial 
neural network based on self-organizing maps that uses a set of low-level metrics to 
characterize the traffic and thus detect DDoS botnet attacks. In a real network environment, 
Daniël van der Steeg and colleagues presented a prototype to detect these DDoS botnet 
attacks using NetFlow.9 
In addition to the aforementioned concerns, the large number of 5G subscribers’ UEs 
with high mobility skills will require researchers //or who?// to adapt the existing detection 
and reaction algorithms to face botnets.10 When bots move, the detection and reaction 
capabilities also have to be moved, “following” the bots, to continue performing their 
procedures accordingly. To address this issue, software-defined network (SDN) and 
network function virtualization (NFV) technologies could be used to enhance the flexibility 
of the network functions’ (NFs’) provisioning and update. Deployment of NFs as software 
elements is key for 5G networks, leveraging on common abstractions for their monitoring, 
configuration, control, and management. In this context, BotGuard11 is a botnet detection 
framework based on SDN to identify botnets promptly, analyzing the topology 
characteristics to detect C&C communication patterns when depicting traffic in convex 
lens imaging graphs. Recently, Cristian Machado and colleagues presented an architecture 
called ANSwer,12 where SDN and NFV features are combined to create network resilience 
strategies. ANSwer discusses the need for maintaining network resilience and 
demonstrates how to deploy and reconfigure SDN and NFV applications in real time to 
achieve satisfactory levels of resilience. 
In this article, we present the design and implementation of an architecture oriented to 
the SDN and NFV technologies with new components to conduct the detection and 
mitigation of botnets in 5G networks. The main novelty of this approach comes from the 
conduction of two control loops, with two different levels of abstraction for detection, 
because of the large number of expected 5G subscribers’ UEs: a light, high-level detection 
to analyze network flows and identify suspicious bots very quickly; and, once possible bots 
are observed, conducting a heavy low-level DPI to confirm that the botnet is in place. For 
its mitigation, we propose the deployment of a virtualized and personalized honeynet to 
isolate the botnet communications through bots’ behavior emulation. In this scenario, the 
bots’ mobility is also considered and properly addressed, managing and detecting UEs’ 
movements to dynamically deploy and/or reconfigure NFs in the 5G network infrastructure 
at runtime. 
Motivating Use Case for a 5G Scenario 
Here, we detail the mobile-aware 5G-oriented solution with a set of steps describing a use 
case, depicting several requirements that should be considered to detect and mitigate 
botnets in 5G networks. Figure 1 shows a given scenario composed of two 5G network 
operators that provide certain services in two different countries. They separate the Radio 
Access Network (RAN) from the non-radio aspects considered as an Evolved Packet Core 
(EPC) network. 
Figure 1. Proactive scenario to detect and mitigate botnets. The scenario is composed of 
two 5G network operators that provide certain services in two different countries. They 
separate the Radio Access Network (RAN) from the non-radio aspects considered as an 
Evolved Packet Core (EPC) network. UE stands for User Equipment, and areas labeled a 
through f indicate the key architectural points where the architecture needs to face 
functional requirements (referred to in the main body text as Requirements a, b, and so 
forth). //More descriptive caption okay?// 
Users in this scenario can move along the different RANs, consuming services at will. 
The UE of a given User is shown who moves requesting services to two servers, Server1 
and Server2. In this scenario, both EPCs belong to the same multitenant service provider, 
with roaming capabilities configured to allow mobility between them. In Figure 1, areas 
labeled a through f indicate the key architectural points where our architecture needs to 
face some functional requirements, so as to allow the discovery of the UE’s purposes: 
whether it’s a real bot contacting a C&C server or it’s a legitimate UE. 
The UE initially connects to RAN1, marked as Point 1 in Figure 1, and starts a 
communication with Server1. This network flow should be analyzed to determine whether 
the UE is a bot and Server1 is a real C&C. This raises Requirement a. A Detection process 
must be deployed in that RAN to perform the required detection. 
As indicated in Point 2 of Figure 1, the user and his or her UE moves to another location 
of Country1. The Detection process should continue its tasks for determining whether the 
UE is a real bot, which began in Requirement a. Because RAN1 and RAN2 belong to 
EPC1, the UE’s IP address doesn’t change and the established connections aren’t 
interrupted. This intra-EPC mobility raises Requirement b. Therefore, the previous 
Detection process must be reconfigured, now taking into consideration the new UE’s 
location. Once this process confirms that the UE is actually a real bot, a Reaction process 
should be triggered so as to hijack the communications between the UE and Server1 and 
thus prevent the execution of future attacks. This Reaction process is highlighted as 
Requirement c in Figure 1. This reaction will only hijack the network flows between the 
UE and Server1, leaving intact the UE’s other communications. 
As a next step, Point 3 of Figure 1 depicts when the UE moves to Country2, connecting 
now to RAN3 belonging to EPC2. This inter-EPC mobility causes the change of its IP 
address, giving rise to Requirement d. Because of this, a reconfiguration of the Reaction 
process deployed in Requirement c needs to be performed, considering the information of 
two different network operators. As a result, the traffic between the UE and Server1 should 
still be hijacked as before in RAN2. 
As any UE is likely to be recruited by a botnet, consider that the UE of the use case 
establishes a new connection with another target, Server2. This is Point 4 in Figure 1. In 
this case, the new Requirement e indicates that another Detection process should be 
deployed and started to determine whether Server2 is actually a C&C. If so, Requirement 
f consists in performing a reconfiguration of the Reaction process running in Requirement 
d, adding the mitigation of the communication between the UE and Server2. 
Proactively Detecting and Mitigating Botnets in 5G 
This section details how the 5G-oriented botnet detection and mitigation proposal 
addresses the aforementioned requirements. This solution uses NFV techniques to deploy 
and/or reconfigure dynamically the virtualized network functions (VNF) needed to detect 
and mitigate botnets, adapting them when UEs move between RANs. Moreover, this 
proposal also leverages the SDN paradigm to modify at runtime the forwarding of packets 
during the detection and mitigation processes. Both technologies are perfectly integrated 
into this solution with the components of 5G networks. 
The proposed solution relies on a Detection process, shown in Figure 1’s use case, with 
two different phases at two complementary levels of abstraction. The first one refers to a 
high-level detection phase, where the network flows between the UEs and Servers are 
monitored and analyzed quickly. It’s worth noting that this phase is always up and running 
to search new suspicious bots. In 5G scenarios, this first phase is mandatory. The huge 
number of UEs and the expected high-bandwidth rates make it impossible to perform a 
deep analysis of all the information flowing through 5G networks. 
To perform this first high-level detection procedure, a Flow Monitoring (FM) function 
is being used, which lets us extract network flows encapsulated into general packet radio 
service (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol (GTP) packets that travel between RANs and EPCs in 
5G mobile networks. As this needs to be always running to analyze all the network flows 
in search of suspicious bots and C&C servers, an FM is initially deployed in every RAN. 
Once a given UE is detected as a suspicious bot, a dedicated VNF providing DPI 
functionalities is deployed and configured (in the RAN in which the UE was detected) by 
following the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Management and 
Orchestration (MANO) NFV principles and procedures.13 Using a DPI tool, //the VNF?// 
seeks specific highly distinctive patterns of particular botnet types, or a change in the 
normal behavior of the UE. As a result of this phase, we can confirm that UEs and Servers 
are real bots and C&C servers, respectively. 
A fine-granularity analysis through a DPI tool can also be seen as Requirement a in 
Figure 1. That is, both detection procedures are conducted in the same RAN1: the first 
phase analyzes the network flows of all peers, while the second one is exclusively focused 
on a much smaller pool of (suspicious) peers. So, the proposed double loop of detection 
allows facing the analysis of large volumes of information generated from the immense 
range of 5G subscribers’ UEs. 
Following the use case of Section 2, our solution relies on software switches such as 
Open Virtual Switch (OVS), deployed in RAN locations, so that the DPI tool can analyze 
the traffic between the UE and Server1. With an SDN Controller, we can control the 
network flows between the components (RAN and EPC components, VNFs, network 
nodes, and so on) of the use case. Specifically, we must add a network flow mirroring rule 
in the OVS flow table to mirror the traffic between the UE and Server1 to the DPI tool 
deployed for its analysis. 
Before the UE can be thoroughly analyzed by the DPI tool of RAN1, the UE moves to 
RAN2. This corresponds to Point 2 of Figure 1, which is depicted in Figure 2 to represent 
the same scenario of Figure 1, but zooming Country1’s components to detail the elements 
of a 5G network. This intra-EPC mobility of the UE is detected by a Long-Term Evolution 
Topology Manager (LTE TM) element. This is a new API provided by the Serving 
Gateway (S-GW) to notify mobility changes in a 5G topology. Thanks to the LTE TM, we 
can know that the UE is now connected to RAN2, and its IP address doesn’t change in that 
transit because RAN1 and RAN2 belong to the same EPC. 
As the UE hasn’t been confirmed yet as a real bot, it’s only suspicious for now, and the 
detection capabilities imposed on RAN1 also have to be moved to RAN2, the new 
placement of the UE. To this end, the actions performed by our solution are as follows, 
indicated as Requirement b in Figure 2: 
• Deploy a DPI VNF in RAN2, similar to the RAN1 one, and configure it with the 
same detection rule to continue analyzing the traffic between the UE and Server1. 
If a DPI tool exists in RAN2, only the detection rule is added without deploying 
more VNFs. 
• Add a network flow mirroring rule in the OVS flow table allocated in RAN2 to 
allow the DPI tool to receive the network flows between the UE and Server1. 
Figure 2. Proposed 5G-oriented solution for the mobile use case. C&C = command and 
control; DPI = Deep Packet Inspection; FM = Flow Monitoring; HLTE TM = Long-Term 
Evolution Topology Manager; HSS = Home Subscriber Server; P-GW = Packet Data 
Network (PDN) Gateway; S-GW = Serving Gateway; SDN = software-defined network. 
//Did I spell out the acronyms correctly? Or please correct as needed.// 
Once the previous actions have been successfully completed in RAN2, the detection rule 
in the RAN1’s DPI tool to analyze the traffic between the UE and Server1 should be taken 
down. Also, the DPI VNF can be de-provisioned still following the ETSI MANO NFV 
procedures for VNFs termination, in case there are no other suspicious bots to be analyzed 
in RAN1. 
If the DPI VNF deployed in RAN2 detects that the UE is a real bot, our solution initiates 
a Reaction process, indicated as Requirement c in Figure 2, which consists in the following: 
• Deploying a new VNF implementing a honeynet that provides the same 
functionality of the UE detected, emulating its behavior through a cloned fake bot. 
Server1 won’t be aware of that change, as it will continue to receive requests asking 
for actions to be executed, but they will be sent by the cloned fake bot. 
• Adding a network flow diversion rule in the OVS flow table of RAN2 to block the 
traffic flow between the UE and Server1, and divert it to the new cloned fake bot. 
This will prevent the UE from executing future attacks, as its functionality has been 
disabled by our deception-based solution through a honeynet. 
As a next step, the UE moves between two countries, per Requirement d. This inter-EPC 
mobility is observed by our solution, taking into account information from the LTE TM 
belonging to each EPC. Specifically, the UE’s IP address changes when moving from 
RAN2 to RAN3, but its stored identifier as an International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
(IMSI) is a unique value that doesn’t change. By correlating this information, our solution 
is capable of discovering the UE mobility. The reconfiguration of the honeynet consists in 
also moving the VNF from RAN2 to RAN3, as well as updating the configuration of the 
honeynet with the new IP of the UE to maintain the emulation features required. To this 
end, we still apply ETSI MANO NFV procedures to deploy the honeynet VNF in the new 
location and update its configuration accordingly. Furthermore, a new diversion rule is 
required in the OVS’s flow table allocated in RAN3. 
As the last step, the UE starts a new communication with another target, Server2. As the 
first detection phase is always running, it identifies that the UE and Server2 are maintaining 
a potential malicious flow. A second detection phase is needed to confirm the botnet, for 
which the deployment of a new DPI VNF is triggered and includes a network flow 
mirroring configuration. This is aligned with Requirement e in Figure 1. Once Server2 is 
confirmed as another C&C, Requirement f finishes reconfiguring the honeynet previously 
deployed. The instantiation of a new honeynet VNF isn’t necessary, as the UE’s behavior 
is being emulated already to manage another botnet. Therefore, a reconfiguration of the 
existing honeynet consists in adding a new functionality that also emulates the new UE’s 
behavior with Server2. Then, another network flow diversion rule must be added to the 
RAN3’s OVS for blocking the link between the UE and Server2, as well as forwarding 
their flows to the already running cloned fake bot. 
Proposed Architecture 
Our architecture uses the four well-known processes for detection and reaction purposes 
— known as the Monitor, Analyze, Plan, and Execute (MAPE) approach — to present a 
functional decomposition of the proposed 5G botnet detection and mitigation architecture. 
This will “close the loop” from monitoring GTP flows and packet (analysis) to the 
orchestrated deployment of new VNFs in real time. As we mentioned, our proposal follows 
an approach of two detection phases with different levels of abstraction (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Workflows of the two control loops of detection from (a) a high-level and (b) a 
fine-granularity level perspective. ABf = average of bytes per flow; ADf = average of 
duration per flow; ANPPF = average number of packets per flow; HNet = honeynet; and 
OVS = Open Virtual Switch. //Did I spell out the acronyms correctly? Or please correct 
as needed.// 
Figure 3a shows the complete workflow for the first detection phase so as to identify 
suspicious bots, as well as the information exchanged between them. The Monitor process 
is the first one executed for gathering network data from the FM and the LTE TM elements, 
and correlating and aggregating it for a subsequent analysis. The FM extracts metrics 
associated with the network flows of the UEs and Servers — for example, average number 
of packets per flow (ANPPF), average of bytes per flow (ABf), and average of duration per 
flow (ADf). 
On the other hand, the LTE TM provides the UEs’ location: media access control 
(MAC), IP addresses, and tunnel identifiers of the eNodeBs at which UEs are connected. 
With this, the Analyze process is in charge of analyzing it to decide whether UEs are 
suspicious bots and each target is a C&C server. If so, the Analyze process sends to the 
Plan one of the IP addresses of the UEs and Servers, and the botnet type is identified. 
During the first detection phase, the Plan process decides to deploy a DPI VNF to 
analyze in detail the exchanged network packets, and modify the OVS flow table to mirror 
the traffic between the suspicious peers to the DPI tool. These decisions are sent to the 
Execute process, which is able to deploy and enforce the required actions to make it 
possible. The Execute process is composed of several components, starting from two 
Orchestrators. The NFV Orchestrator (NFVO) is capable of automatizing the process of 
applying the decisions made by the Plan process regarding the deployment and 
configuration of the VNFs. Following the ETSI MANO NFV procedures, the NFVO 
interacts with the VNF Manager (VNFM) to instantiate and dynamically configure the DPI 
VNF (as a combination of virtualized network and compute resources) in the virtualized 
infrastructure that’s managed by the Virtualized Infrastructure Manager (VIM). Finally, 
the SDN Orchestrator (SDNO) is in charge of automatizing the configuration of the SDN 
plane, thereby configuring the OVS flow table through the SDN Controller to apply the 
network traffic mirroring rule. 
Figure 3b depicts the processes conducted during the second detection phase. First, the 
Monitor process gathers, aggregates, and correlates the single alerts produced by the DPI 
VNF, as well as gathering the location information from the LTE TM. Note that these alerts 
carry the botnet type and the IP addresses of the suspicious bots and C&C servers, which 
are sent to the Analyze process. The system //or what, specifically?// then decides if 
they’re actually bots and C&C servers. If so, the botnet type and the IP addresses are sent 
to the Plan process, which decides to deploy a honeynet per bot so as to hijack its network 
flows with a C&C server. These decisions are applied by the Execute process. To this end, 
the NFVO automatizes deploying honeynets as VNFs through the VNFM, on top of the 
VIM; configures them with the botnet type and the IP addresses of the bots and C&C 
servers, through the VNFM; and the SDN Controller is requested by the SDNO to add the 
network flow diversion rule for managing the network flows between such peers. 
Implementing the 5G-Oriented Solution 
This section details how the implementation of our proposed architecture combines free 
and open source SDN/NFV technologies in a fully virtualized environment, together with 
certain custom 5G software components to address the requirements highlighted in the use 
case. 
Following the MAPE architecture, the Execute process is built integrating three existing 
SDN/NFV platforms running in a VNF per each //module or component, or what, 
specifically? A word is missing here.//. The role of the NFVO is covered by the 
OpenBaton framework (http://openbaton.github.io) that’s fully compliant with the ETSI 
MANO specification14 and supports different types of VNFMs and VIMs. In our 
implementation, we make use of the version 3.0.1 that supports autoscaling, fault 
management, and the possibility of configuring the VNF external networks through the 
VIM command interface. OpenBaton also provides a generic VNFM component that we 
customized to meet the reconfiguration requirement of a VNF at runtime, as indicated by 
Requirements b and f in the use case. 
We use OpenStack Liberty (see www.openstack.org) to cover the role of the VIM, 
basically for the following reasons: it’s the de facto open source cloud management 
platform; it’s compliant with OpenBaton; it’s possible to integrate it with OpenDaylight 
(www.opendaylight.org) version 0.4.2, chosen as the SDN Controller; and it uses OVS as 
a software switch for VNF instances. In our proposal, VNFs are virtual machines (VM) 
that execute certain components required to perform the detection and reaction procedures. 
Specifically, during the detection process, the DPI VNF is a VM executing an instance of 
Snort IDS tool version 2.9.7.0 (www.snort.org), supporting GTP, while during the reaction 
process the honeynet VNF runs a generic application acting as a bot to cheat the C&C. 
In the SDN/NFV integrated environment, OpenDaylight and OpenStack are both in 
charge of network management. In particular, while OpenStack controls the networking at 
layer 3, OpenDaylight controls the OpenStack internal OVS instances to be capable of 
installing OpenFlow rules received from SDNO in their flow tables. SDNO is a custom-
developed software that interacts with the SDN Controller through the OpenDaylight 
REST API interfaces and generates the proper OpenFlow rules when network flow 
mirroring and network flow diversion actions are required. When the Plan process decides 
to install a rule in OVS, SDNO queries the controller’s inner datastores to retrieve all 
needed network topology information. This procedure is necessary to identify the involved 
switches and hosts (UEs, VNFs, C&C, and so on) connected to them. Once the targets (that 
is, bots, the C&C, and Snort when generating the network flow mirroring rule) are 
identified in the network, SDNO generates the flow rule as a JavaScript Object Notation 
(JSON) payload of a REST query to send to OpenDaylight. 
To replicate a 5G environment as realistically as possible, we consider the Open Air 
Interface (OAI; www.openairinterface.org) wireless platform, which provides a software-
based implementation of EPC and RAN compatibles with the Third-Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP) LTE standard. Both the radio and core packet facilities must 
be considered as part of the solution infrastructure. Thus, in our implementation, they’re 
deployed as VNFs outside the NFVO/VNFM, and can be considered as part of the 
infrastructure. 
The FM component is a 5G-oriented software, developed to extend the OVS monitoring 
features. Indeed, although OVS supports different types of monitoring protocols, it isn’t 
able to extract information encapsulated into GTP flows. The FM extracts information and 
generates network statistics about the IP, TCP/UDP, and application-level packets 
encapsulated in GTP. The FM is integrated into the virtualized infrastructure as part of the 
RAN, and belongs to the Monitor process. 
Finally, the LTE TM element is a customized part of the OAI that’s located at the EPC, 
holding information related to UEs’ movements and triggering mobility events. When a 
given event regarding the UE mobility happens, the LTE TM produces a message that’s 
stored in a repository. Three kinds of messages are considered: create, update, and delete. 
Each message brings an information payload related to the UEs and mobile infrastructures: 
eNodeB, P-GW, S-GW, and so forth. In this way, we’re able to know the first time that a 
UE is connected to a specific RAN (create), the moment when UE changes the RAN 
(update), and when a UE is no longer connected to the RAN (delete). Hence, actions from 
the LTE TM let us track UE’s mobility, and therefore reconfigure the detection and reaction 
processes of our solution. 
The high mobility capabilities of UEs, as well as the large volumes of data generated in 
emerging 5G networks, require developing innovative solutions to address cyberattacks 
conducted by botnets. With our 5G-oriented solution, the 5G network infrastructure is 
dynamically reconfigured to detect and mitigate botnets proactively, using a double control 
loop of detection and deploying a virtualized and personalized honeynet, respectively. 
Detection and reaction functionalities will maintain their capabilities even when 
subscribers move in a highly dynamic 5G network. This solution uses innovative features 
enabled by combining SDN/NFV techniques. 
In future work, we’ll explore ways of moving detection and reaction between network 
operators in interprovider scenarios, where new security and privacy conditions will arise. 
In addition, we also plan to evaluate our architecture and the current implementation we 
have running in our internal lab environment — which properly detects and mitigates Zeus-
based botnets — as well as addressing other types of botnets. 
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